

Rethinking Humanitarian Action in Situations of Forced Displacement: Focus on Northeast Nigeria



Edited by: Seun Kolade

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Programme

Tuesday 16th July 2019

Time	Activity	Lead
08:30 - 09:30	Registration	Mr Hassan Adebayo
09:30 - 10:45	Welcome and Introduction	Dr Seun Kolade
10:45 -11:15	Keynote address	Governor/representative
11:15 - 11:45	Response and comments	Invited political office holders
11:45-11:55	Tea break	
11:55 - 12:45	Paper presentations 1	Prof Saliba James, Dr Abigail Taiwo and Dr Seun Kolade
12:45 - 13:30	Co-creation lab 1	Round table co-mingling: Dr Demola Obembe
13:30 - 14:20	Lunch break	Jades Hotel
14:20 - 15:05	Paper presentations 2	Dr Joseph Eyong, Mrs Ene Obi, Dr Fred Ebot
15:05 - 15:50	Co-creation lab 2	Round table co-mingling: Dr Sam Olanrewaju
15:50 - 16:20	Closing comments and feedback	Open floor
16:20 - 16:40	Bringing it together	Dr Seun Kolade

Wednesday 17th July 2019

Time	Activity
10:00 – 11:00	Research presentation
11:00 – 12:00	Data adjustment and confirmation
12:00 – 13:00	Data and research conversation
13:00 – 14:00	Closing comments and feedback
14:00 – 16:00	Informal socialisation and departure

Introduction

The United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR) reports that there are 25.4 million refugees and 68.5 million forcibly displaced people, and only a small fraction are able to return to their former homes (UNHCR 2019). The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has precipitated humanitarian tragedy on a scale comparable to the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and arguably the worst of any manmade or natural disaster in Nigeria's history. At one point, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that up to 3.3 million people were internally displaced due to terrorist violence by Boko Haram (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). The number of people displaced by this conflict is one of the largest in the world. Contrary to traditional top-down approaches to humanitarian action, this proposal places a strong emphasis on the agency of displaced peoples, and how this is developed and expressed at the individual level (human capital) and the communal level (social capital). This project therefore addresses an urgent need by scrutinising how humanitarian actions can be redesigned around affected people as the main actors, not just recipients of aid. The project sits right at the heart of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) goal 16 focusing on peace, justice and strong Institutions, for which DMU was recently chosen as a Global Hub. It also links closely with SDG1 on poverty eradication, SDG3 on health and well-being, SDG4 on quality education, SDG8 on decent work for all, and SDG11 on sustainable cities and communities.

Traditional, mainly material approaches to interventions in disaster situations have come under increased scrutiny in recent years because they have failed to deliver desired long-term outcomes and have encountered resource and capacity constraints in the face of continually expanding humanitarian crises. In particular, scholars and practitioners are highlighting the need to shift from the current emphasis on material solutions and financial input, to an approach that combines both material and social solutions, bringing people and communities to the forefront of humanitarian action (Aldrich & Meyer 2014; Wind & Komproe 2012; Johnson et al. 2013). The study therefore seeks to examine the extent to which the displaced populations are drawing on social and human capital to withstand, cope with and recover from the adverse experiences and consequences of the insurgency and counterinsurgency. This can point to opportunities and methods for humanitarian actors to stimulate social and human capital among crisis-affected people purposively as part of their interventions, with the aim of better outcomes and value for aid money.

This workshop brings together a broad spectrum of stakeholders beginning with affected households, and including frontline NGOs, government executives and legislators, key agencies, and media practitioners, among others. As well as discussion papers, a key feature of this workshop is the series of co-creation lab sessions. In these sessions, participants will be encouraged to brainstorm and generate practical ideas and new insights based on the expert presentations. It is hoped that this approach will facilitate better outcomes and greater impacts in humanitarian interventions, especially in situations of forced displacement.

Seun Kolade

Project Lead, July 2019.

**Paper 1: critical reflections on coping mechanisms of displaced households in northeast
Nigeria**

By

Prof Saliba B. James

Department of History, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria

Introduction

This paper is a reflection on observations made, in the course of four research exercises on Boko Haram/ ISIS-WA insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria, that I have been involved with. The precise focus of each of the researches might have been different but they invariably touch on the effects of the insurgency on victims within and outside Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps.

The massive dislocation of persons estimated at over 2.2 million in 2015 and 2.1 million in 2018 (UNHCR, 2015 and 2018) and equally huge disruption of economic activities created challenges of meeting their needs. The immediate solution has been expectedly Federal and State government's intervention through National Emergency management Agency (NEMA) and State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) and significant relief activities of Humanitarian organizations such as United Nations Agencies, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and national Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This consist of 2000 national and 500 international staff. (UN Report, 2018) Faith based and cause oriented groups and philanthropic individuals also lent helping hands. Today there are over one hundred and fifty Non- governmental Organisations and affiliates operating in the northeast of Nigeria.

The governmental and non-governmental groups engage in varied forms of humanitarian interventions including victim protection services, food, shelter, water medical care, education, latrines and so on. Such humanitarian assistance, in the way they are currently executed, have largely nurtured and shaped the attitudes of the IDPs to their circumstances and expectations negatively. The coping mechanisms of most victims are underpinned by heavy reliance on humanitarian interventions. A "dependency tendency" has taken hold among a large segment of the affected households, which is counterproductive for post insurgency reorientation and resettlement. The dependency tendency evolved gradually as the insurgency progressed, making return of victims to their rural homes difficult. A new approach is required that will

revive the victims confidence in their self-reliant and self sustaining capabilities as they re-examine their livelihood recovery strategy.

The four studies

The four research projects that underpins this paper are outlined as follows:

1. History, Causes and Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Maiduguri,” 2016.

The research objective was to reconstruct the insurgency from the peoples perspective in terms the historical background, causes and motives experiences and impact. The scope of the research was limited to IDPs camps in Maiduguri, but the victims were from different Local Governments in northern Borno. The camps were Farm Center, Bakassi, Shehu Sanda Kyarimi, Dalori 1and 2, Gubio, NYSC and Dikwa.

The methodology was based on qualitative approach. Key Informants Interviews (KII) using unstructured open ended questions were conducted with both men and women.

The victims attributed the insurgency to illiteracy and poverty and in some cases suspected influences of Al-Qaeda and ISIS-WA. Horrible experiences of long treks with children from Monguno through Nganzai to Maiduguri on foot were recounted.

The IDPs camps provided much needed security and life saving access to basic needs. Government and NGO efforts was greatly appreciated all. Yet most victims were unhappy with prevailing conditions in the camps, where they appear to exist in a nanny state. In addition to the problem of congestion, they complained lack of freedom of movement and the limited opportunities to exercise their agency. At this stage they mostly desired to return to the comfort of their homes.

A 42 years old female trader succinctly put it thus:

I will like to go back to Dikwa when the situation improves. I do not like to stay in the camp because life in the camp is very hectic, you will wait for the officials to provide for you. But if you are in your own house you do whatever you wish without anyone dictating to you on what you eat or where you wish to go. (Respondent YG, 2016)

Most were dislocated from their homes about June 2014 and had therefore spent more than a year in the IDPs camps. Yet interestingly, they had not developed attachment to camp life and dependent attitude on government and NGOs intervention programmes. Their desire was to return home when conditions were right.

2. Collaborative Research on Global Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience. December 2016 to February 2017.

The research objective was to assess the performance of the Military in the counter-insurgency operation before and after the ascension of President Muhammadu Buhari and the Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Tukur Y. Buratai to office. This required interviewing different stakeholders in the northeast including Traditional Rulers, Religious leaders, Business men and women, Military officers, Political leaders, Borno Elders, Academics, Women leaders, NGO staff, and IDPs. The research covered the three states most ravaged by the insurgency, that is, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Both KII and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were employed in the methodology.

The research was conducted in late 2016 and early 2017, long after President Buhari had declared the Boko Haram technically defeated back in December 2015, following recovery of territories hitherto held by the insurgents. The Army itself held that the Insurgency had been substantially degraded and insurgents capacity to hold territory lost. While it was true that the Boko Haram lost the strength to hold territory, they however, continued to carry out deadly periodic attacks on Army formations and communities in rural areas. Since the Local government areas were unsafe, the IDPs remained in camps within Maiduguri and neighbouring states of Adamawa and Yobe.

As in 2016 the response to the IDPs crisis remained deployment of Humanitarian assistance by NEMA, SEMA United Nations agencies such as UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA etc., International and National Non-governmental Organisations including Medicines Sans Frontieres(MSF) or Doctors without Borders, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Action Aid, ICRC, Action Against Hunger (AAH), Norwegian Refugee Commission (NRC), Save the Children, Federation of Muslim Women of Nigeria (FOMWAN), Primary Healthcare Agency (PHA) and so on.

These continued with provision of Humanitarian interventions as indicated above but new aspects were being added. For instance, PHA in conjunction with UNICEF began to offer Antenatal Clinics, rendered Family Planning Services Counseling on HIV/AIDs and

prevention of mother child transmission, routine immunization, Community Management of Acute Mal-Nutrition (CMAN) and Direct Observed Therapy for TB. (COAS Research, 2017)

One interesting development was noticed at the Malkohi IDPs camp in Yola, which showed possibilities of alternative approach to humanitarian action. In addition to provision of food and nutrition by the ICRC and education to the children by the Army Education Corps, the IRC middle chamber set up a Skilled Acquisition Programme (SAP). (COAS Research, 2017) A small centre with about four sewing machines was set with a view to encouraging self-reliance. Some of the IDPs indicated that they engaged in farming in lands acquired from residents of the host community. This was in spite of the strict rule governing movement in and out of the camp. It is instructive that these self-help entrepreneurial ideas were initiated by the IDPs, in part due to the limitations of humanitarian assistance and shortages of material support. This underscores readiness, and arguably the preference, of IDPs, to support themselves and not depend on Government and NGOs only.

In other IDPs camps in the three states, enterprising households engaged in petty trading within the camp in assorted food items, with help of some camp officials who assisted in sourcing the items. This is significant because it was indicated of a desire for self sustenance among persons that were use catering for themselves back home.

3. An assessment of market systems in post-insurgency era in the Lake Chad Basin (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, Nigeria), 2018.

The research was sponsored by Northeast regional Initiative, NERI and conducted by the Centre for Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (CPDDS), of the University of Maiduguri. The methodology was based on KII and FGD.

The objectives of the research were to:

- Assess the impact of the insurgency on market systems in selected communities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states
- Map out current market systems networks and linkages within the selected communities
- Examine the challenges and security threats faced by market stakeholders in the post insurgency era

- Identify the current potentials and capabilities that can be utilized for enhanced efficient market activities.

The research did not focus on IDPs living in camps, but on traders in communities affected by the insurgency. Although the traders were not displaced, the insurgency impacted their trading activities negatively. This posed questions of what forms of assistance they need and how that can be extended to IDPs that could be trained and oriented towards such trades as alternatives to dependence on humanitarian assistance.

The research findings showed that trades in different items like Cattle, sheep/goats, grains, fish, vegetables and legumes, fruits, transportation etc. were significantly affected. For instance before the insurgency 23% of traders could earn #300,000 or more per week, but during and after the insurgency only 3.3% could earn that much and 82% earned only #50,000. This resulted from insurgency related depletion of capital, low turnover, and low patronage of goods. Lack of storage facilities also affected incomes. To turn things around the study recommended reorientation of government and traders, especially on adequate financing of traders to gain access to capital for their businesses and the development of cottage industries in the region for traders to buy into them, (NERI, 2018). Interestingly, it recommended the immediate take-off of the North-East Development Commission (NEDC) to work with donor agencies in assisting traders in revitalizing the economy.

Thus if traders in IDPs camps and outside can be properly reoriented, financially empowered by government and donor agencies a new tendency towards self reliance can be encouraged and adopted as alternative to humanitarian intervention.

4. Picking up the Pieces: Social Capital, Human Capital and Coping Strategies of Households Displaced by Boko Haram Insurgency in northeast Nigeria.

The research envisages action towards resolving the crisis facing the over 2.1 million internally displaced people in the northeast of Nigeria. The research attempts to shift attention away from traditional top down approach of humanitarian intervention, to involving and empowering displaced victims themselves, first as individuals (human capital) and the communal level (social capital) in calibrating alternative responses effects to the insurgency. Displaced persons take center stage not as recipients of humanitarian assistance but contributors to new coping mechanism and strategies.

The current research experience revealed the predominance of the humanitarian assistance in the existing IDPs camps by the various agencies identified earlier. Among others International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and World Food Programme (WFP) give food and material assistance through Vendors. The IDPs are given ration Cards, which they call Jan Takarda, that is, Red Card (colour may not be red) to claim quantified rationed items from Vendors. The Vendors are then paid through vouchers by the NGOs. New IDPs arriving the camps are given temporary cards which they call Farin Takkarda, that is, White Card, as a form of registration. They cannot claim rations with it. There is therefore usually great anxiety on the part of the IDPs for the Red card. While the rationing of items is necessary for the survival of the IDPs it can create a dependency tendency.

Apart from material support, some NGOs even give cash assistance to IDPs. Data gathered at Muna IDPs camp in Maiduguri, through SEMA for instance, confirmed that the World Bank gives ₦7000=00, to individuals who clean the camps and ₦30,000 naira per month, to individual youths within the camps. The funds are disbursed through the Borno State, Youths Empowerment Social Support Operation (YEESSO). The amount is not tied to any specific objectives or pre-planned activities. Given idle youths money without proper objectives and structures of use can also result in over reliance.

Other organizations such the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) offer skills training to IDPs in camps. Centers were set for providing skills training to women. Participants are given seed funds to continuity in the trade. In Gwoza IRC, Plan International (PI) and Mercy Corps (MC) run empowerment programmes. After the training the women are given materials such as a bag of flour to begin with. Only Mercy Corps gives financial seed funds. Some provide skills training in making soap, morning fresh, petty trading, tailoring, local perfumes Turaren wuta, etc. A local NGO Gender, Equality, Peace and Development (GEPaDC) organized training for women in local briquette production, who further step it down to other women. The products are handy replacements for firewood and charcoal.

The eagerness and readiness of IDPs to engage in self help coping mechanism is also evident among rural victims who are willing to engage the old vocations and hire out their labour. The hiring out of labour is very pronounced in Adamawa, where due to total absence of government and humanitarian support, IDPs stream out of camp everyday to work in Yola city in order to buy food for their families. Most IDPs from the shores of the Lake Chad including Baga and Doro who were fishermen are willing to serve as hired workers on construction sites and

farmlands in the raining season, through which they make considerable savings.. Those from Kala-Balge who were mainly herdsmen keep on with animal rearing and poultry farming. The women engage in production and sales of diary products like milk, butter and cheese.

Key Observations

Due to the magnitude of humanitarian crisis unleashed by the Boko Haram insurgency, with over 2.1 million people displaced, both governmental and non- governmental responses have been based on a top-bottom approach of providing much needed humanitarian intervention. While that has been essentially it also created three challenges:

- a. The emphases on provision of much needed humanitarian assistance in forms of food and other material needs has gradually created a dependency tendency among victims. This may have long term psychological impact on work attitude of children growing up in IDPs camps as the insurgency drags on.
- b. There has been realization of need to wean victims away from such dependency attitude through innovative provision of empowerment programmes. Entrepreneurial skills training are being provided in some places without properly planned financial and material support for sustainability. For instance a woman was given #5000=00 as seed capital for business. She invested it and made a profit of #4,090=00. The donor agency collected back the principal amount, split the profit into two and left her with only half of it. The World Bank/YEESSO #30,000=00 financial assistance to youths without clear objectives is another case in point.
- c. The unplanned withdrawal of humanitarian assistance by both government and non-governmental bodies in Adamawa exposed vulnerable victims in IDPs camps to risked. Victims were not relocated to their homes as pronounced by the previous regime, obviously due to persisting insecurity in the rural areas. No empowerment programme was introduced to take advantage of existing skills among the IDPs for self sustenance.

Alternative Approach

- a. A new bottom-up approach should be attempted in addressing IDPs needs. This should involve individuals and communities in interpreting their situation and recommending solutions. How do they themselves see and understand their situation? What do they think they need or want? How do they want it? Community development concepts of partnership and ownership may be useful in attending to IDPs situations.

b. The determination of empowerment programmes, especially entrepreneurial skills training should involve individuals particularly youths whose interest should be known and the communities. Training programmes should encompass basic rules of business including goals and purpose, budgeting, proper book keeping, reinvestment of profits etc., which are currently lacking among the enterprising IDPs.

c. Financial seed funds and material support for continuity should be accompanied by clearly defined and monitored conditions, goals and objectives. Monthly payments given as seed funds should not be unending, otherwise it will breed dependency and lack of commitment to set goals. Such seed funds should be sufficient to guarantee sustainability.

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Paper 2: On the psychological functioning of the forced displaced people (IDPs)

Dr Abigail Taiwo, University of Wolverhampton, UK

Forced displacement refers to situations, which occurs and result to the forced movement of people from their locality or environment and or occupational activities. Such situations or circumstances could be natural disasters, armed conflicts or war. However, in broader sense, this could include displacement triggered by economic hardship.

The forced displaced individuals resulting from the armed conflicts or war are often forced to flee their home region to which they are attached and for which they have the knowledge to make a living most effectively (UNESCO,).

Two groups of forced displaced individuals seems to emerge. These include the refugees (that is, those who could run away from the locality where the circumstances that made them to run occurs); and the internally displaced persons (that is, those who still subsist and reside within the same country or close to the area where the circumstances that made them to run occurs). There is now growth in the number of those internally displaced persons worldwide. The Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described the Internally Displaced persons as; “persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or leave, their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflicts, internal strife, and habitual violations of human rights, as well as natural or man-made disasters involving one or more of these elements and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.” The people currently displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria are currently the largest group of the IDPs in Nigeria. The psychosocial consequences of being force-displaced is colossal and this could debilitate psychosocial functioning of these individuals. In terms of two types of forced displaced individuals, the internally displaced are more likely to suffer different types of psychological trauma either in comparison to their counterpart who are able to move away from the area where their displacement took place. The experience of forced displacement and the uncontrollability of the circumstance may be regarded as a major stressor following Hans Selye’s Psychophysiological theory of stress and Seligman’s theory of learned helplessness.

Selye Hans (1907-1982) was the first to use the word stress in medical lexicon to describe nonspecific response of the body to any demand. He first noted that when experimental animals were subjected to different stressful situations, their reactions seems to remain the same across board and the impact in their body yielded pattern of illnesses that relate well with a type of

brain channel. His psychophysiological theory emphasised the mind-body linkage in the reaction to and coping with stressful situations. He divided individual responses to acute and chronic stress.

He explained that there is a difference between an acute stress response and the total response to clinically applied stressors, and he called this General adaptation syndrome (GAS). He further explained that individuals who experience chronic stress often respond to stressor in three phases, that is, the alarm reaction, the stage of resistance and the stage of exhaustion. The explanation is that when individuals are exposed to a stressor, they will first be taken off-guard and probably react hysterically (like in the state of fight or flight). After this, there will be an attempt to maintain balance (that is homeostasis) by resisting the change. The last stage is that they will eventually give to exhaustion. In man, the exhaustion may not be like the exhaustion shown by the animals in the Selye's experiment, but may induce different forms of psychophysiological illnesses like ulcer, chronic pain, psychosomatic illnesses, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health problems.

The GAS is seen as the body's way of adapting to a perceived threat to better equip it to survive.

The second theory relevant to the experience of the IDPs is Martin Seligman's theory of learned helplessness which showed that when an individual is faced with some uncontrollable events or trauma, they could produce some passivity and this could significantly debilitate the individual and produce inability to learn that responding is effective, or could possibly result into depression. The various studies conducted by Seligman focused on the behavioural and psychological impact of uncontrollable traumatic events. Part of his results showed that the escape-avoidance behaviour of over 150 dogs, which had received prior inescapable shocks was impacted significantly. Two-thirds of the dogs do not escape even when there is a way to escape electric shocks; the other one-third escaped and avoided in normal fashion. It is obvious that failure to escape is highly maladaptive since it means that the dog takes 50 seconds of severe, pulsating shock on each trial. In contrast, only 6 percent of experimentally naive dogs fail to escape in the shuttle box. So, any given dog either fails to escape on almost every trial or learns normally. In relation to the IDPs, individuals who might find themselves in this state of helplessness might be very passive to ways of improving their wellbeing or becoming economically empowered, more importantly if they have developed inescapable psychological shocks from their forced displacement.

As the people internally displaced by the NE Insurgency continues to make sense of the experience they've had, it might be that they are experiencing significant level of bodily sensations that could impact on their adequate functioning and may require some assessment and intervention to settle down to this new condition, and engaging in more proactive surviving strategies.

Recent studies now revealed that traumatic experiences, which is also known as chronic stress, often leave some long lasting impact on individuals. These studies have focused on the allostatic loading components and have reported some results, which showed relationships between high allostatic loading and some negative behavioural and physiological outcomes. Identifying the presence of chronic stress early as well as the need to mitigate its negative impact on the IDPs' functioning might be a good step towards empowering them. The allostatic loading studies not only showed that chronic stress impact the body significantly, but also that adverse childhood experiences such as being forced displaced could result into long-lasting impact in adulthood. This has significant implication for the young children and youth going through these experiences. It is therefore important that interventions targeting the children and the youths should focus on the psychological impact of these experiences on them to design effective intervention that could prevent future problems.

Paper 3: Entrepreneurship as a strategy for livelihood recovery among the displaced

Dr Seun Kolade, De Montfort University Leicester

Introduction

Within the past decade, two important and related concepts have gained traction within the entrepreneurship literature. The first is the idea of emancipatory entrepreneurship, and the other is the better-developed theory of transformative entrepreneuring. Emancipatory entrepreneuring is linked more closely with Sen's ideas around capabilities and functionings (Sen, 1989, 2008), and it has been explored in the contexts of poverty and forced displacement (Al-Dajani, Carter, Shaw, & Marlow, 2015). It emphasises the scope for the poor and the displaced to exercise their agency to beat the poverty trap and break "free from the authority of another". Similarly, transformative entrepreneuring has been defined as "the process of addressing and ultimately transforming conditions of protracted socio-economic constraint through entrepreneurship" (Tobias, Mair, & Barbosa-Leiker, 2013, pp. 728). The theory of transformative entrepreneuring draws heavily from fields such as social psychology. Among other things, the theory analyses how conflict is often instigated and aggravated by in-group bias and outgroup prejudice, and how entrepreneurial opportunities and activities can be instrumental in lowering prejudices and bringing together otherwise mutually hostile groups.

At the heart of these related ideas is a departure from the traditional notion of entrepreneurship as high-wealth creation activity that is associated mainly with developed economies. In recent decades, the idea of entrepreneurship as an instrument for poverty reduction and, more recently, conflict mitigation, has gained increased attention. The global entrepreneurship monitor (GEM) now tracks entrepreneurship activities in both developed and developing countries of the world.

In this brief paper, my aim is to highlight a number of issues relating to the nature of poverty, conflict and resource struggle. I will then raise some pointers on how entrepreneurship can play a critical role in poverty reduction and conflict mitigation. Finally, we will bring the displacement crisis Northeast Nigeria into focus and discuss how some of these ideas can be operationalised within the Northeast Nigerian context.

Poverty, conflict and resource struggle

At the heart of all man-made conflicts is the over-arching question of resource struggle (Humphreys, 2005). This can be about the struggle for resources in their primary, most basic form- and it can be related to greed over abundance or grievance induced by scarcity

(Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009). For example, Hitler spoke of the “struggle for living space” as the dominant reason for venturing into war. Conflicts typically arise when resources are appropriated by dominant groups and distributed unequally. Poverty is often associated with lack of access to resources or the lack of capacity to transform resources and create value from them. Population density and population is invariably a key factor in these. The more the people over smaller area of usable land, for example, the more likely there will be violent struggle for resources.

Natural resource is a unique factor in the emergence and escalation of conflict. First, it lends itself readily to violence because ownership and control is based mainly on the exercise of superior physical power. On account of this, the most powerful in any society tends to appropriate and control more than their fair share simply because they have the means to do so. They can then consolidate their control by using the rents from the resources to acquire more wealth and power. This includes the acquisition of political power to establish their legitimacy.

However, the forceful control and accumulation of natural resources by the dominant group often create a large group of the dispossessed and oppressed. This, in turn creates a tension and disequilibrium in the system, as the (majority) dispossessed seek redress by challenging the authority of the dominant group.

Poverty and conflict are mutually aggravating. Poverty alienates the poor from the establishment, breeding grievance and discontent. This grievance at first takes the form of spontaneous, then organised protest. At this stage the discontent is more amenable to a negotiated process of political settlement. Ironically, at this stage, political settlement is not always the option of choice for the dominant group, unless and until they feel their dominant position is genuinely threatened. In time, the tension between the marginalised poor and the dominant group evolves into more destructive forms of organised rebellion and violent insurrection. This is the stage in which insurgency and terrorist groups emerge, milking the opportunity from the environment of disillusionment and discontent.

Conflict and poverty induced by resource conflict are especially common in developing countries, where there is heavy reliance on natural resource rent. In developed countries, wealth creation is less driven by natural resource allocation and rent-seeking approach. Rather, through the development of human capital and use of technology and innovation, these countries are to create new products, generate more wealth and facilitate the provision of key

services that enhance citizens' well-being and productivity. Furthermore, developed countries tend to have more effective institutional structures and political arrangements that facilitate more equitable, but by no means perfect, distribution of wealth. The existence of these existent institutional structures are also linked the logic of a population more actively engaged in the process of creating wealth in the first place. As such, citizens tend to be more politically conscious and actively involved in creating and continually improving those institutions. Conversely, in developing countries where there is more reliance on resource rent and citizens are less involved. Therefore, the institutions tend to be weak and open to manipulations by the elite to protect and consolidate their own interest.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that entrepreneurship presents a wide range of opportunities to be more actively engaged in the process of generating more wealth. They are therefore more invested in the process of creating, improving and maintaining relevant institutions to protect and equitably distribute the wealth- thus reducing poverty and mitigating conflict.

Entrepreneurship, poverty reduction and conflict mitigation

Entrepreneurship as a concept is underpinned by two key ideas: opportunity recognition and value creation. Other factors and features associated with entrepreneurship tend to coalesce around these two key ideas. For example, in the course of exploring newly identified opportunities, entrepreneurs tend to deploy innovative technologies and novel approaches that disrupt the market, create new products and services, and ultimately generate wealth.

From a resource perspective, entrepreneurs harness new technologies to create new products from existing, and limited, natural resources. This in effect multiplies resources available for use by people. Not only do they drive the multiplication of resources, they are also actively engaged in value adding activities. This value addition in effect make resources more useful for a wider range of uses, and naturally available for more people. In other words, entrepreneurship can facilitate a positive change in a population's interaction with resources. Instead of engaging in violent conflict over limited natural resources, citizens are co-opted as co-creators of new resources for the benefit of all.

The entrepreneurship process has several direct practical implications on the dynamics of poverty and conflict. Entrepreneurship can create new employment opportunities, and therefore raise household income and welfare. Furthermore, by creating new resources, entrepreneurship invariably make new resources available for the population, thereby reducing resource poverty. Also, as noted earlier, the market functions of entrepreneurship require the creation of new

networks among the population, including the construction of bridging and linking social capital with groups that otherwise have minimal or little contact. This helps to build trust, lower outgroup prejudice and engenders societal cohesion and communal peace. Finally, the creation of new ventures entails ownership and responsibility which motivates citizens to be more actively invested in societal peace. It minimises the risk of leaving a large proportion of the populace at the margins of the society, vulnerable to extremist tendencies and recruitment into violent groups.

Entrepreneurship as livelihood recovery strategy: focus on Northeast Nigeria

Northeast Nigeria is one of the largest geopolitical zones in the country in terms of land mass. The zone also has an estimated population of close to 30million people, and more than 1.5million are internally displaced due to the insurgency. The region also has the highest proportion of poverty in Nigeria, and economic activities have been hampered by disrupted access to markets and trade routes. Agriculture, which is the mainstay of the regional economy, has been severely hampered due to large scale destruction of farms, disruption of rural markets, lack of transportation, lack of farm input, and drought. In addition to agriculture, there are needs and opportunities in the other sectors of the economy, including low-tech manufacturing and services. There are therefore opportunities to structurally transform the regional economy.

Combining vocational and entrepreneurship skills for value creation

A considerable proportion of the Northeast population, like other regions in the country, are engaged in various vocational activities. However, the opportunities to add value and make profit are limited by deficiencies in entrepreneurial skills in terms of using innovative methods and technologies, and marketing skills to access new markets, both regionally, nationally and internationally. This gap between vocational skills and entrepreneurial skills can be bridged through appropriate policy instruments that should include training and provision of relevant technical support and finance for entrepreneurial activities.

The current approach includes housing displaced peoples in camps where they can access relief materials and emergency services, among others. While humanitarian assistance is necessary, it can often, especially in the long term, lead affected people to embrace a dependency mindset. However, governments and other stakeholders can employ a more creative and bold strategy that effectively IDP camps into vocational parks. With this approach, affected peoples are given new opportunities to use their skills to begin to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of the displacement. It also enables them to contribute to the local economy of the host communities,

and this can only be a good thing for communal relation as it fosters a positive perception of displaced peoples.

Furthermore, a vocational park for displaced peoples is effectively a co-creation hub where similar vocations can converge into clusters, share knowledge, resources and skills, and expand their markets. It can also be a springboard to inject dynamism and drive innovation in the wider entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Stimulating entrepreneurship through public procurement

Public employment has been used to great effect in both developing and developed countries. In the UK, for example, the government in 2014 set out a new plan for public procurement in the agriculture, food, health sectors. That was in recognition of the fact that the public sector was, at the time, spending about £2.4 billion per annum in procurement of food and catering services for school pupils, hospital patients, armed forces, prisons, courts and various government agencies (UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2014). That was a considerable proportion of the total UK food service sector sales. Therefore, the new government plan set out to benefit about 3 million people employed in the UK food and farming sector by incentivising farmers and food producers to operate to high production standards, and by promoting a well-skilled, competitive food sector by building training and opportunities into contracts. These would then have direct positive impacts on the health sector by promoting healthy eating and overall societal wellbeing.

A major barrier to entrepreneurship in developing countries is the challenge of under-developed markets and low demand that is associated with low purchasing power in the population. This is the case currently in Northeast Nigeria, where already widespread poverty has been aggravated by the insurgency. These in turn provide little incentives for entrepreneurship activities. However, given that governments are the biggest procurers in the world, there is an opportunity to use public procurement to incentivise entrepreneurship in the Northeast. Procurement can be used in a strategic and targeted way to drive demand and reward entrepreneurial activities. For example, government can contract IDP farmers to supply raw produce for government-sponsored free school meals, produce school uniforms for government sponsored free school uniforms, and deploy the services of IDPs in public construction works. However, this policy instrument has to be used in a strategic way, not to make IDP entrepreneurs dependent on government contracts. Instead, they can use it to drive innovative

practices and methods that can be used to create higher quality products and services that can be attract bigger markets.

Concluding remarks

This paper began by highlighting key points about the emancipatory function and transformative impact of entrepreneuring, and how these can be instrumental in tackling poverty and mitigating conflict. The ideas of emancipatory and transformative entrepreneuring are closely linked the concept of social capital in its bonding, bridging and linking forms. The paper then provides reflective commentary on how entrepreneurship can positively transform the interaction of the human population with natural resources, in terms of creating new forms of resources from the natural form, and making these available for wider use and distribution. Finally, I have identified some practical ideas and policy instruments that can be used to operationalise entrepreneurship as a livelihood recovery strategy among the displaced populations of Northeast Nigeria. Implementing these ideas requires more political will than funding, not least with regard to existing funds already being used for public procurement. What is also required is a synergistic, co-creation approach that draws inputs from affected population, the NGOs in the frontline, government itself, and key stakeholders in the private sector. One key objective of this workshop is to, at the very least, initiate this co-creation process.

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**Paper 4: Rethinking humanitarian action in situations of forced displacement:
Experience from the North East of Nigeria**

By Mrs Ene Obi, Country Director, Actionaid Nigeria

Key areas

- The International nature of humanitarian action
- Involving women beyond just beneficiaries but as leaders
- Gender dimension in humanitarian intervention – involvement in decision making and the quality of GRPS in IDPs – children will still give birth, women will still have their menstrual cycle – who takes charge, who cares when those who take decision - men – many pregnant women lost their lives as they could not run with heavy pregnancies
- Violence against women and girls – Psychosocial support needed but very few hands to attend to many people
- Back to home project
- Linking preparedness, response and recovery
- Forced Migration - Livelihood and recovery: People are left bare after the storm of insurgency
- Forced returns – Government and the international communities
- Balancing dependence on aid and support persons in prolong humanitarian situations
- Burden on the host community – as people are pushed into other towns where their relations are
- People living with disabilities and humanitarian interventions
- Governance and LGAs of people displaced – Issues of transparency and accountability – Implications for local government budget and aids – The people from the affected local governments can be traced to the camps and be provided for with the money budgeted
- Back to home project for the thousands of orphans – placing them with communities
- The Youth and the insurgency;
- The Media: It is critical to have a media strategy embedded in any proposal to enable investigative journalism and learning for the journalists
- Coordination

The international nature of humanitarian action: Experience in the North East of Nigeria shows that humanitarian action is still very much international in outlook notwithstanding the

international commitments such as the grand bargain towards localization. However, the efforts of humanitarian international organizations in the region fall short of ensuring that local organizations actively participate in the response. There is always the question of the capacity of local organizations or individuals, but We must recognise and appreciate the value that both local and international actors bring to the table and conscious efforts made to ensure capacity strengthening and transfer, not only in terms of technical capacity but also in institutional system strengthening for local state and non-state actors.

Involving women beyond just beneficiaries but as leaders: From ActionAid Nigeria's experience, women's involvement and ensuring their leadership adds value and increase the effectiveness of humanitarian actions. Most humanitarian interventions target and involve women as beneficiaries but we must step away from just involving women as beneficiaries alone but also as active partners and actors within the space. This is not only empowering but goes a long way in removing traditional barriers to women empowerment and participation.

Linking preparedness, response and recovery: Efforts by humanitarian actors must link and knit these three phases of humanitarian actions. Recovery efforts are incomplete if they do not prepare communities for future emergencies and response during emergencies. It is important to state that preparedness has also become a funding priority too.

Forced returns: The North East of Nigeria has witnessed some measures of forced returns both locally and internationally. But such returns must be voluntary and devoid of any form of coercion. In Nigeria, the joint engagements of actors in responding to local push for forced returns is commendable. This initiative was led by the Humanitarian Country Team and the INGO forum, and it was clearly communicated to the government. However, the case of uncommunicated forced returns from neighbouring countries is an example of how lack international coordination of such return's efforts could hamper proper administration and intervention. A situation where thousands of displaced persons or refugees are loaded in trucks and taken back home without prior notice or proper documentation remains worrisome.

Balancing dependence on aid and support persons in prolong humanitarian situations: Prolonged humanitarian situations can cause actors and donors to develop some sorts of fatigue. Yet, it is important that when funding dwindles, we are not leaving people behind or making them more vulnerable. For instance, talking about the implementation of targeting and beneficiary criteria in the North East, many displaced persons were removed from beneficiary lists and replaced with new arrivals. Unfortunately, this was done without any options in terms

of livelihood and support. Consequently, this automatically led to clashes between IDPs and aid workers and disruptions at the distribution sites.

Coordination: In humanitarian response, like we have in the North East, coordination ensures that the effectiveness and distribution of scarce resources are optimised. However, the different organizations participating in humanitarian actions must be willing to submit and allow for coordination to be effective. In the drive to scale up individual agencies' humanitarian interventions, the ethics of working together can be easily forgotten and this may lead to agencies going into unhealthy competition.

All said and done, AAN looks forward to a new order of humanitarian response(s) where beneficiaries are not just at the mercy of humanitarian agencies and their allies but being capable of conceptualising the kind of sustainable supports that come naturally with human dignity and respect. This is expected to leverage more on affected/displaced people's social capital and native intelligence as buffer for their preparedness, response and recovery challenges.

Paper 5: Public Service Leadership in turbulent times: practical reflections on North Eastern Nigeria

By Dr Joseph Eyong, Researcher in Leadership, De Montfort University Leicester

In the wake of the emerging challenges imposed by increasing number of internally displaced persons, private, public, political and none governmental (NGOs) require extraordinary leadership. Although a complex phenomenon and practice, effective leadership is important in the management of organizational and social crisis. In the end, it is often certain individuals at privilege positions of authority who make decisions and judgements about how resources are to be deployed, what approaches to take and what solutions to adopt and how to apply them. It is therefore understandable why rightly or wrongly, effective leadership is often associated with high performance and successful organizations. Various concepts been showcased as best practice in leadership and human resource management discourses to good effect. Surprisingly, the aspect of effective leadership tends to be overlooked in contemporary crisis management discourses not just in Nigeria but also across most African nations. The normative view in Nigeria is that leaders and organizations involved in crisis management are infallible. Leaders and organizations are perceived as the ‘solution to the problem’. The immediate effect of this pathology is often the creation of political economy which in the end leads to ‘shadow-chasing’.

It is therefore evident that by taking our eyes away from the inner workings of the leadership of NGOs and local government councils (LGCs) in particular and not ensuring effective leadership at all times through leadership conversation and training, we may not be serving ourselves well. Leadership knowing and leadership doing is even more relevant when dealing with an existential problem of the magnitude of addressing the plight of IDPs.

It is important therefore that we explore approaches to leadership that could enable frontline organizations and public service institutions to overcome some of the challenges faced by IDPs in North Eastern Nigeria. Leadership has been defined in many ways. Perhaps the most popular definition is the view that it involves a process where an individual influences another individual or a group of persons to achieve set goals (Northouse, 2018). Anchoring our thoughts around this definition but acknowledging that there many other definitions, it is important to look at what effective leadership could achieve not just for immediate victims but equally as part of the wider mission of local councils, state governments, NGOs and the nation

to deliver on particular aspects of the United Nation's (UN) sustainable Development goals 2030 (UN, 2016).

In this talk, I examine the concepts of Transformational leadership (Burns 1978; Bass, 1985); Charismatic leadership (Northouse, 2018); Paternalistic leadership (EK Pellegrini and Scandura, 2008); authentic leadership (Avolio and Gardner, 2005) and Ubuntu leadership theory (Mbigi, 2005). Through inter-subjective co-creating in whereby we cast our thoughts around the theoretical constructs of these five theories, it is hoped participants will become aware of these constructs and perhaps find novel ways in their organization to become more considerate in the manner in which they execute leadership in practice as they engaged with the process of developing social and human capital amongst IDPs.

Paper 6: The Human and Material Cost of Boko Haram Insurgency Displacement in the Far North Region of Cameroon

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Discussion Paper prepared for the practitioner/stakeholders' workshop on "*The Human and Material Cost of Boko Haram Insurgency Displacement in the Far North Region of Cameroon*" in Abuja, Nigeria. This paper was presented between July 16th and 17th July 2019. This discussion paper is part of a workshop for the Global Challenge Research Fund (GCRF) project being funded by De Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom. The title of the original project is "*Picking up the Pieces: Social Capital, Human Capital and Coping Strategies of Households Displaced by the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeast Nigeria*".

Abstract

This discussion paper responds to the question of how we might assess and understand the human and material cost of Boko Haram insurgency in Cameroon. The report addresses two other controversies within the Boko Haram Crisis in the Far North Region of Cameroon. First, whether external and internal displaced population are coping using social networks and vocational skills. Second, to what extent does the government and other key stakeholders helping to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development opportunities for the population in crisis. Preliminary findings and recommendations stresses the need to design policies that will enable the region move from an emergency approach to a pro-development approach of the 239,000 IDPs in the Far North Region of Cameroon, most of whom come from areas close to the border with Nigeria, want to stay in their new homes. Recommendations are also made for the Cameroon government and other stakeholders adapts and implement development policies to local social-economics realities taking into account both the immediate priorities expressed by the local population for survival and the requirements for sustainable recovery and development necessary for longer-term regional stability.

Keywords: Boko Haram Insurgency, External and Internal Displacement, Social Network, Vocational Skills, Role of Government, emergency approach to a pro-development approach

Introduction

The discussion paper addressed and analyses the human and material cost of Boko Haram Insurgency displacement in the Far North Region of Cameroon from 2014 to present and puts forward proposals for dealing with the external and internal displaced population that includes former Boko Haram combatants and vigilante groups. This report does not deal with overall

responses to address the threat posed by Boko Haram but focuses instead on a series of deep social and economic problems addressing how effectively external and internal displaced population are coping using social networks and vocational skills which the government and other stake holders can use in helping to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development opportunities for the population in crisis. This study will help determine whether the country can make the transition to greater stability. It stresses the need to design policies that will enable the region move from an emergency approach to a pro-development approach, and recommends the government and its stakeholders adapts and implement development policies to local socio-economic realities.

The Human and Material Cost of Boko Haram Insurgency

The Far North of Cameroon is a region filled with landmark of routes and cultures. Besides trade and commerce, the local economy is based on tourism, agriculture, fishing, handcrafts and hunting, livestock farming, transportation of goods. The informal sector is strong, and contraband rife. Rich traders, merchants and traditional chiefs – often members of the ruling party and high-ranking civil servants – are significant economic actors (The International Crisis Group Briefing Paper 133, 2017).

Up until the 1980s, the region's different ethnic communities were engaged in specific economic activities depending on their respective geographic zones, climates and traditions. Before the arrival of Boko Haram, desertification and poverty had already debilitated these specialisations, such as fishing for the Kotoko, livestock farming for the Choa Arabs, agriculture for the Mafa, with the exception of trading in the case of the Kanuri. Forced to move, people have taken their traditional skills with them and diversified their sources of livelihood: in the Logone and Chari, the Kotoko, who were formerly fishermen, now also farm rice and exploit natural resources; and many Choa Arabs, traditionally livestock breeders, are now involved in commerce and agriculture (International Crisis Group Briefing Paper 133, 2017)

Today, the Far North Region of Cameroon is the drama of dreadful violence by the terrorist jihadist movement Boko Haram insurgency that has brought the greatest single cause of displacement in the Far North Region of Cameroon with over 239,000 people becoming a refugee or an IDP at the end of 2017 as a result of the crisis. This crisis alone in the far north region of Cameroon accounts for 67% of the total number of people displaced. Cameroon -new displacements records 119,000 (33%)- people from conflicts also burned up again in the Anglophone areas of Cameroon, particularly the Northwest and Southwest regions, toward the end of 2016. Dozens of people were killed when protests increased in the second half of the year, leading to symbolic declaration of independence that was met with a government crackdown and arrests. The violence triggered the displacement of tens of thousands of people.

The above statistic indicates that in Cameroon 358,000 people are either refugee or an IDP. Our estimate is based on Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID, 2018) data, which focuses mostly on the 67%—of forcibly displaced people within the Far North region of Cameroon.

The Republic of Cameroon has suffered excessively from Boko Haram’s insurgency in neighbouring Nigeria since 2013, particularly in the Far North region. There was a number of Boko Haram attacks since May 2013 in the Far North Region of Cameroon, including suicide bombings carried out by children, both boys and girls; theft and looting of villages belonging and properties and killing of innocent civilians, as well as mass kidnappings of local civilians and migrants working and living in the region. Moreover, since late 2013 the far north region has expanded as stage for clashes and arrests of suspected Boko Haram soldiers and kidnappings of foreign nationals. Ransom payments for hostage releases have provided Boko Haram with one of its main sources of revenue (Amnesty International, 2017). In the Far North Region of Cameroon, such attacks have been characterized with killings, bombings, and property destruction (including that of schools, homes, offices and businesses). The terrorizing effect on the regions socio-economic conditions has become so devastating that institutions and businesses have largely closed down.

President Paul Biya declared war on the group in May 2014. The fighting has led to the death of more than 1,400 civilians, driven 73,000 refugees and 155,000 internally displaced from their homes and the Jihadis group remains a threat. Frequent incursions and attacks perpetrated by or attributed to the group have killed approximately 20,000 civilians as in the Northeast of Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2015) and generated a constant climate of insecurity and unpredictability. However the actual number of fatalities is likely to be much higher. The death toll by Boko Haram is in 2015 alone is 3,500 civilians. Civilians have over the years been shot, beheaded, amputated, stoned, drowned, burned and bombed. The killings were often preceded by persecution, death threats or Boko Haram “inviting” men, boys and girls to join them in “in the work of Allah” (UN Human Rights Council 2015)

“At a national level, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculated the budgetary impact of the conflict at around 1-2 per cent of gross domestic product in 2015— in other words, between \$325 and \$650 million” (International crisis Group Briefing Paper 133, 2017).

But the overall economic impact over the past four years has been greater still, since the conflict and its consequences have led to the paralysis of the local economy and slowed down the national economy. The indirect cost and loss for the country as a whole have not yet been analysed in depth at a national level.

It is well understood from the International Crisis Group and other online publications explained that the Cameroonian state does not provide information on the funds allocated to

the war against Boko Haram. However, the defence ministry and national security delegation budgets have increased from \$305 to \$420 million and from \$130 to \$145 million, respectively. This points to an increase in security expenditure of more than \$500 million over the four years of conflict, without including non-budgeted defense spending, such as on Operation Alpha in the Far North, led by the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and supported by the secret funds and financial support from partner countries such as the U.S (International crisis Group Briefing Paper 133 (2017)).

Boko Haram's activities in Cameroon are thought to have increased since April 2015, as a result of increased military operations in the four Lake Chad region countries that border Lake Chad—namely, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (members of the Multinational Joint Task Force - MJTF), driving insurgents and civilians from the latter to the former. The arrival of external and internal population has caused tensions and led to forced returns at the hands of Cameroonian forces, which in turn led to the signing of tripartite repatriation agreement between the governments of the two countries in the Lake Chad regions and UNHCR (GRID, 2018)

The International Crisis Group in their reports about the Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon's Far North region has devastated local populations and worsened the region's under development and poor governance. They are expanding that the political-economic situation in Cameroon is particularly shaky due to declining oil prices, reduced trade, closing borders and increased expenditure used on fighting Boko Haram, all of which is draining Cameroon's economy. While levels of violence in the Far North have diminished, the Cameroon government and other stakeholders has a long way to go in tackling the underlying factors that allowed Boko Haram to gain a foothold, notably the state's lack of legitimacy, poverty, some communities' exclusion from power and divides between local elites and the younger generation.

Humanitarian and Social Situation of the Displaced Population

The Far North is the poorest region in Cameroon, with 74 per cent of the population living below the poverty line, compared to an average of 37.5 per cent in the country as a whole. This situation has been exacerbated by the conflict and, now more than ever, the Far North is perceived by the authorities and donors as a region requiring aid rather than an area offering economic opportunities. The closing of the border with Nigeria has dented both the local and national economy, especially since neighbouring Chad—under normal circumstances an importer of goods from the Far North—is also facing a crisis (International crisis Group Briefing Paper 133, 2017).

Humanitarian aid plays a vital role in the Far North Region of Cameroon, but community solidarity is also very robust. As of today, most of the 239,000 displaced persons in the Far

North have been given accommodation and supported by host families. There is very limited information how external and internal displaced population are coping using social networks and vocational skills. Further to this, the “president’s donations” and contributions from the southern Cameroonians have totaled FCFA2 billion (\$3.6 million). Yet these solidarity mechanisms have soon shown their limits: host communities are under great pressure, making them as vulnerable as those who have been displaced (International Crisis Group, Briefing Paper 133, 2017)

Between 2014 and 2017, international partners substantially increased their support for refugees and IDPs, especially after the Oslo summit in February 2017, which aimed to increase humanitarian assistance and development aid to countries in the Lake Chad basin. But their contribution is not enough to meet the needs. The Cameroon government has also been contributing to the care of Nigerian refugees since 2015, but does very little to assist IDPs. It has launched two modest emergency plans for the region, which still receives only a small part of the Public Investment Budget (PIB), although this share has been rising since 2014. These efforts therefore fall short of what is needed, as estimated by the UN and local officials.

On the contrary, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased in 2017. In May 2018, the region had 96,000 Nigerian refugees (including 65,000 at the Minawao camp) and 239,000 IDPs. Of the region’s four million people, 2.1 million needed humanitarian assistance in January 2018. But the level of funding for humanitarian aid is low, while insecurity and the government’s reluctance to provide escorts for humanitarian actors hampers access to vulnerable people. The situation of Cameroonian, Nigerian refugees and IDPs therefore remains precarious (International Crisis Group Report 263, 2018).

Given this backdrop, important questions must be raised and hopefully addressed, such as: what is the impact of the human and material cost of the Boko Haram insurgency in the socio-economic conditions in Cameroon? What policy recommendations are appropriate as the Cameroon government seeks to respond?

Role of the Government and other key stakeholders

The Cameroonian former Minister of Communication, Issa Tchiroma, had discussed about the barbaric aggression for which Cameroon has been paying a high price since 2013, because of the barbaric and criminal attacks by the terrorist organisation Boko Haram. The Minister of Communication again "exalted the courage, determination and efficiency" of the Cameroonian armed forces, supported in this by the bravery of the surveillance committees working with the public authorities, to track and ferret out these vicious criminals, everywhere they might be in Cameroon.

Security forces have captured more than 1,000 suspected Boko Haram members since 2014 and accepted the surrender of about 200 between October and December 2017. In 2017, the

number of Boko Haram's civilian and military victims fell by about 20 per cent compared to 2016 and 40 per cent compared to 2014-2015 (International Crisis Group Report No 263, 2018).

Since 2015, Cameroon military has forced more than 120,000 refugees outside the camp back to Nigeria, officially for security reasons. The UNHCR has protested this deportation and asked the authorities to establish screening centers on the border (International crisis Group Report 268, 2018)

In March 2017, Cameroon, Nigeria and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on the voluntary return of refugees overland. However, the return of the first group, scheduled for January 2018, was postponed indefinitely. In fact, fewer and fewer refugees are ready to return to Nigeria, meaning that Cameroon could have to host tens of thousands of refugees on a permanent basis.

Role of other key stakeholders

World Bank GSURR team and a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) team worked jointly to produce this Regional Assessment of Forced Displacement by the Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region.

A sub-regional force reconstituted in 2015 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission to fight Boko Haram and created the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),. Soldiers are irritated because they thought deployment with the MNJTF would mean bonus payments like those paid to the Cameroon contingent of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic. But the MNJTF is not a UN mission and each country is responsible for paying and equipping its own contingent. Many soldiers are under the false impression that their "international" bonuses are being misappropriated. It is true, however, that the defense ministry sometimes paid bonuses for soldiers in the Far North that had been in arrears between 2014 and 2017. Some soldiers have accused senior officers of misappropriating these bonuses.

Foreign partners, notably the U.S., the European Union and Japan, should support investment in communities into which former militants will reintegrate and initiatives aimed at demobilising vigilantes, including them as beneficiaries of development projects. Some vigilante groups will not trust traditional chiefs or local authorities to administer government or donor funds alone; better would be for local NGOs also to be involved in their disbursement (International Crisis Group Report 263, 2018)

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permanent basis.

Since 2014, vigilantes, numbering some 14,000 in the Far North, have played an essential role against Boko Haram. They provide critical intelligence to Cameroonian forces, act as scouts and guides, and sometimes confront jihadists directly and protect their villages, especially against suicide attacks. The authorities offer them little support, however. Some have become disillusioned and abandoned the struggle. Some vigilante groups will not trust traditional chiefs or local authorities to administer government or donor funds alone; better would be for local NGOs also to be involved in their disbursement (International Crisis Group Report No 263, 2018)

Foreign partners, notably the U.S., the European Union and Japan, should support investment in communities into which former militants will reintegrate and initiatives aimed at demobilising vigilantes, including them as beneficiaries of development projects. For now, however, the priorities are to deal with surrendering or captured combatants and prepare for the vigilantes' future. The manner in which the government handles those challenges will determine whether the Far North can make the transition to greater stability. Lastly, the fight against Boko Haram in general and the reintegration of former members in particular goes hand in hand with respect for human rights.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the assessment of the human and material cost of Boko Haram Insurgency displacement in the Far North Region of Cameroon, a few policy recommendations can be quickly advocated. First, we need better data to assess whether external and internal displaced population are coping using social networks and vocational skills in order to make the allocation of humanitarian aid much more. Second, to what extent does the government and other key stake holders helping to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development opportunities for the population in crisis. The conflict in the Far North has caused economic distress for the local inhabitants and shaken up communities' ways of life. The situation poses two fundamental questions for the government and development community: How to revive the Far North's economy without playing into the hands of Boko Haram? How to implement development policies that are integrated with the national economy while respecting local practices, when such practices are a source of resilience but are often at the limits of legality?

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